Modi’s Nuclear Ambitions: A Double-Edged Sword for Energy Security

The Prime Minister’s announcement of a 100 GW nuclear power target by 2047 has sparked debate in the energy sector, with some hailing it as a bold step towards self-reliance. However, beneath this ambitious plan lies a complex web of challenges and opportunities.

India’s nuclear programme has long been plagued by issues of scale, cost, and safety. The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam marks an important milestone in the country’s three-stage nuclear power programme. This sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor uses plutonium-based fuel while breeding additional fissile material – a technology that has been touted as a game-changer for India’s energy security.

Critics argue, however, that this approach will only exacerbate existing problems with waste disposal and proliferation risks. The PFBR is still in its experimental phase, and its commercial viability remains untested. India cannot afford to bet on a reactor technology that has yet to prove itself at scale. Moreover, the government’s reliance on imported fuel and equipment raises concerns about the programme’s long-term sustainability.

Modi’s nuclear ambitions are closely tied to his broader vision for India’s energy self-reliance. In his Independence Day address, he linked the country’s nuclear expansion with the rapidly increasing demand for electricity driven by industries like semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and data centers. Energy security has become a pressing concern as India expands its technology and manufacturing sectors.

The government’s efforts to expand the sector are evident in the SHANTI Act, enacted in December 2025. This legislation provides greater autonomy to private players and relaxes safety standards, but critics worry about the risks of nuclear accidents and proliferation. The Act’s provisions have been criticized for being overly permissive, raising concerns among experts.

India’s renewable energy capacity is growing rapidly, with solar energy capacity rising from 2 GW in 2014 to 160 GW today. The country has set a target of 500 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, but meeting this goal without compromising its nuclear ambitions will be challenging. Modi’s emphasis on expanding both nuclear and renewable energy capacity raises questions about the government’s priorities and the trade-offs involved.

The Indian energy landscape is complex and multifaceted, with competing interests and priorities vying for attention. As the country hurtles towards a 100 GW nuclear power target by 2047, it would do well to assess the risks and benefits of this ambitious plan. Can India truly achieve energy self-reliance through nuclear power, or will this strategy prove to be a double-edged sword that exacerbates existing problems rather than solving them?

The PFBR’s technology is particularly relevant to India’s nuclear strategy because the country has relatively limited uranium resources but substantial thorium reserves. The Department of Atomic Energy has said the PFBR will eventually help lay the foundation for the third stage of India’s nuclear programme, in which thorium would be used to produce uranium-233. However, this long-term vision is still a distant one, and the government’s immediate focus on nuclear expansion raises questions about its commitment to sustainability.

As India expands its energy infrastructure, it must also grapple with the environmental and social implications of its decisions. The country has made significant strides in renewable energy capacity, but its nuclear programme remains shrouded in controversy. Can Modi’s nuclear ambitions be reconciled with India’s broader goals of sustainable development and climate action?