Middle Powers in a G2 World: The Trump-Xi Summit’s Unwelcome Consequences

The upcoming meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping has sparked anxiety among foreign policy analysts, who see it as a potential precursor to a “G2” world where the US and China make decisions that impact middle powers like Australia. This concern is not new; in fact, it’s been a long-standing issue. The context, however, has changed significantly – escalating trade tensions, growing Chinese assertiveness in the Pacific, and uncertainty surrounding Trump’s approach to geopolitics.

A stable relationship between the US and China has long been crucial for countries like Australia, which benefits from both economic and strategic ties with Beijing but also values its security alliance with Washington. However, this delicate balance is being tested as Trump’s words and actions have consistently raised more questions than answers. Some analysts attribute to him a “sphere-of-influence philosophy” that suggests a world where great powers dictate regional agendas, leaving middle powers exposed.

Michael Kovrig, a former Canadian diplomat and geopolitical risk consultant, has been vocal about the risks associated with this approach. In his recent article for Foreign Affairs, he noted that US allies have limited trust in Trump’s ability to represent their interests when dealing with Xi. This lack of faith has led them to diversify their relationships with Beijing, forming stronger links among themselves.

The immediate interest for Australia is resolving the conflict in the Middle East and reopening the Strait of Hormuz – a goal shared by both Washington and Beijing. Beyond this, however, Canberra would like to see a stabilizing agreement between the two superpowers that doesn’t compromise middle powers’ interests. The risk, as Kovrig suggests, is that Trump’s “dealmaking fervour” may lead to concessions that leave countries like Australia exposed.

The optics of the summit are also concerning. If Trump and Xi can present an optically successful meeting where both sides declare victory without clear commitments, this could create ambiguity and uncertainty for middle powers. Beijing would likely test these ambiguities by pushing harder on Taiwan, the South China Sea, or economic coercion – a predictable move given its Leninist organization’s modus operandi.

Countries like Australia are downplaying any criticism of China to avoid being seen as more critical than the US, thereby maintaining a veneer of security. However, this strategy has limitations – middle powers cannot indefinitely hide behind Washington’s shadow while trying to manage their own complex relationships with Beijing.

The worst-case scenario for Australia would be an optically successful summit that leaves the country unsure of what Trump has promised Xi. This would embolden Beijing to continue its salami-slicing tactics, pushing further into the Pacific Islands and South-East Asia, expanding Chinese influence in the region, and increasing military assertiveness in Australia’s immediate area.

The Trump-Xi meeting is not just a bilateral affair – it has far-reaching implications for middle powers like Australia. As Kovrig astutely observes, “the way the Chinese Communist Party works” is to take as much as possible until someone stops them. If they believe they can exploit Trump’s dealmaking style with soybean deals or other concessions, the consequences will be dire.

The Australian security community should be worried – not just about the potential for a failed summit but also about an outcome that appears successful on paper but leaves middle powers vulnerable to Beijing’s coercion. The coming days will reveal whether Trump and Xi can navigate this high-stakes dance without putting countries like Australia in harm’s way.